phor differ from those of literal language. But first we will consider the role of communication principles in the understanding of literal and metaphorical expressions.
One of the major unresolved questions in the study of language is to what extent communicative principles guide the understanding of language. This question will be present in the background throughout our discussion, but we will not attempt to answer it. We would, however, challenge the common belief that communicative principles are more crucial to the understanding of non-literal than of literal language. We suggest that, to the extent that communicative principles are crucial for metaphor comprehension, they are equally important for literal-language understanding.
First, we will discuss the general question: Should principles of communication be part of a theory of language understanding? We will consider two approaches that provide contradictory answers to this question. One approach assumes that communication is irrelevant to a theory of language, the other that communication is crucial for understanding language. We will then show that despite this disagreement, these two views share a number of basic assumptions. Both approaches assume that the understanding of literal language differs in important respects from the way in which metaphorical language is understood. The implicit area of consensus between these diametrically opposed approaches is their agreement that communicative principles underlie the understanding of figurative, but not of literal, language. We will argue against this pervasive idea and suggest that the same basic operations underlie people's understanding of both literal and figurative language. On the one hand, we will show that those aspects of comprehension that are not constrained by communication principles are shared by literal and metaphorical language; on the other hand, we will argue that, when communicative principles are used, they are used similarly in both metaphorical and literal language. We will then propose a model of metaphor understanding and conclude with a discussion of the different communicative functions that literal and metaphorical language may serve.
Language and Communication: Two Traditions
Language may serve a variety of functions, but it is generally agreed that language is predominantly a tool for communication. Language may be used to describe states of affairs and to express thoughts and emotions; it may be used to manipulate people, to convince, to beg, to demand, and so on. All of these functions of language must assume a communicative context and must be constrained by the rules of communication. In order to be understood, speakers and writers implicitly observe such rules even when they "only" make assertions or provide descriptions and even when no clear target audience is present. Listeners do their part by observing the same principles and assuming that speakers do so as well. This is a sketchy description of the cooperation that occurs between people when they are engaged in communication (Grice 1975 ). It does not necessarily tell us how the cognitive system operates in order to achieve such cooperation. One of the goals of cognitive science is to discover precisely those processes that underlie our use of language and to explain how they eventually afford communicative interaction.
Paradigms of linguistic research vary in terms of how central communication processes are to their theories. At one pole is the tradition in which communicative principles are assumed to be irrelevant to the study of language, such as formal theoretical linguistics, as exemplified by Noam Chomsky. In his Russell Lectures, Chomsky puts it succinctly: "Though consideration of intended effects avoids some problems, it seems to me that no matter how fully elaborated, it will at best provide an analysis of successful communication, but not of meaning or of the use of language, which need not involve communication or even the attempt to communicate" (Chomsky 1971: 19) . This basic assumption has been part of all standard grammatical theories influenced by Chomsky's research program, regardless of whether their main concern is with the syntactic or the semantic aspects of language (cf. Lyons 1977) .
At the other end of the continuum, standard pragmatic theories assume that in order to understand the way language works one must consider communicative principles, as exemplified by H. P. Grice's influential work on meaning and on the rules of conversation. Grice (1975) argued that the very act of using language raises expectations of cooperation between speakers and listeners. Listeners expect speakers to be clear, truthful, informative, and relevant. These expectations guide every process of interpretation, regardless of whether the speaker fulfills them or appears to be violating them. When Joel asks his roommate, Jim, what the date is and Jim answers, Today is September 3d, (1) he is probably following the rule relevant, and so on. But if Jim s asked about the date, he is floutin then infer that Jim wants to remi due. In this way the very same e the implied meaning of the utte Even though the standard gram are diametrically opposed on mos tions about non-literal language. F literal. When, for example, a metaphorical sentence is encountered in discourse, its literal interpretation is always apprehended before any figurative interpretations are considered. Second, they both assume that a metaphorical interpretation is sought only after some anomaly, semantic deviance, or pragmatic rule violation has occurred. For standard semantic theories, semantic anomaly triggers a search for nonliteral meanings. For standard pragmatic theories, apparent violations of discourse rules or rules of conversation trigger the search for nonliteral meanings.
The assumption of the priority of the literal, then, is central to both types of theories. Standard semantic theories, which ignore communication, take it for granted that a literal interpretation is always the first step in the comprehension process. This assumption simplifies many aspects of those theories, but it complicates their accounts of metaphorical interpretation. For example, to explain how people understand such sentences as a fisherman is a spider (2) these theories may need to postu mechanisms. One way to resolve Donald Davidson (1979 Davidson ( [1978 ), f account of this sentence is simpl cause a fisherman is not a spider yond this, such as a possibly met analysis. A more traditional solu go beyond the initial literal an an elaborate theory of the sema suming that the initial interpret A literal analysis initially yields as (2) because several selection re fisherman has the feature "hu violations, according to Levin, are leads to solving the comprehens rules that adjust selection restric solving the anomaly, and ultimat In this way, solely by semantic m rules, and without any referenc this approach propose to account A solution such as Levin's has its limitations. One drawback results from the assumption that deviance is a necessary condition for the construction of a metaphorical meaning. Thus, it cannot account for metaphors that do not violate semantic rules. For example, the sen-
it is a desert does not involve any semantic anomaly or deviance, yet it can be understood metaphorically, as in The major problem for many people these days is loneliness. It is a desert. Such a theory as Levin's may be able to explain this in the following way: Once the indexical "it" is replaced with "loneliness," the result, loneliness is a desert, manifests the same kind of anomaly as does (2) afisherman is a spider. This anomaly would then trigger the adjustment rules. Even though such counterexamples as (3) can be explained away by such a semantic theory, there are other kinds of sentences that are understood metaphorically, yet involve no semantic deviance. One example of this type is Groucho's tongue is not a bayonet, (4) which is neither semantically deviant nor anom ing a "trigger" of deviance, this sentence does meaning, which is so clear that most people wi with it. The semantic approach fails to accou precisely because it ignores the communicative Standard pragmatic theories, such as Grice's, to deal with these examples, yet they make the tions. The first assumption is embodied in the sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Sent posed to be the basis for determining what t long as the speaker does not flout the basic "ma the speaker probably means what she says. In su meaning is computed prior to the speaker mea what the speaker intended when there is no re wise. John Searle (1979) expresses the same i that the understanding system initially assesses interpretation of each sentence would be. So, ac the wind is a rocking chair (5) would first be analyzed literally, only to anomaly, the next step would be to look cal meaning in the sentence. The anomal triggering condition for the construction tation. This idea was clearly stated by B Strauss (1987) , who said that the "[comm to break down to the extent that anoma cause "language users simply do not ac is required to "turn the deviance into m "metaphors may be viewed as arising fr one of Grice's conversational maxims" (ib If the violation of Grice's maxims trigg terpretation, this approach can also ac (4) Groucho's tongue is not a bayonet, tha literal interpretation, but are nonetheless understood metaphorically. In this case, the sentence is first analyzed literally, only to suggest the obvious: Groucho's tongue is excluded from the category of bayonets. This trivial interpretation violates the maxim of informativeness. Assuming that the speaker is being cooperative, one looks for an alternative, more informative, metaphorical interpretation. In this way, rule violation is a necessary condition for metaphor comprehension.
In summary, both standard semantic and pragmatic theories assume that the construction of literal meaning is always the first step in interpreting any sentence in any context. Furthermore, both approaches assume that metaphorical interpretations depend on specific triggering conditions. To be sure, they differ on the nature of these conditions, but they agree that a search for metaphorical meaning starts only when a literal interpretation is either anomalous or deviant, or when it violates one or another rule of conversation.
Communication and Metaphor: An Alternative
We will challenge the central assumptions of the standard theories and argue that they are inadequate for a psychological theory of metaphor understanding. Our central argument is that communicative principles are equally important for literal and metaphorical language use and that they constrain literal and metaphorical interpretations in the same way. We will discuss conditions under which literal interpretations seem to be constructed irrespective of communicative needs and will show that a metaphorical interpretation may be constructed in exactly the same fashion, thus suggesting that a "trigger" is not a necessary condition for understanding metaphors. Then we will consider those linguistic operations that seem to be constrained by communicative functions. For example, we will discuss the cases of apparent rule violation that lead to a metaphorical interpretation, arguing that the same conditions may also underlie the construction of literal interpretations. In this sense, both literal and metaphorical interpretations may be similarly constrained by communicative rules. After discussing the conditions for the construction of either literal or metaphorical interpretations, we will focus on how metaphors are understood. We will argue that communicative principles play a major role at this level of analysis and that they operate similarly for literal and metaphorical statements. We will then suggest that metaphorical statements may be distinguished from literal ones on the basis of what they are used for, instead of the conditions for their comprehension.
The Priority Issue
Competent speakers of a language cannot ignore the meaning of a word. People cannot, for example, name the color of the ink in which the letters are written without also realizing the meaning of the word those letters comprise (Stroop 1935) . Similarly, we cannot prevent ourselves from understanding the meanings of sentences. Semantic and syntactic operations simply take place without our conscious control, in an involuntary manner. Some aspects of understanding may take place, then, regardless of any communicative needs or circumstances. The question is, what is "the meaning" that we can't help but grasp? Both approaches that we presented above implicitly assume that the literal meanings of sentences are always obligatorily computed. Are metaphorical meanings grasped only optionally, then, or are they also computed obligatorily?
In order to address this question, Sam Glucksberg, Patricia Gildea, and Howard Bookin (1982) asked people to read sentences and to focus on their literal meanings. Subjects were asked to assess the literal truth of each sentence as quickly and accurately as they could. Some of these sentences were literally false, but made sense metaphorically. For example, a mountain road is a snake (6) is literally false but metaphorically se to take longer to reject as false than not make sense metaphorically, such a mountain road is a tree. (7) A reasonable interpretation of such f ment with the metaphorical meaning feres with the task's demand for a ne tences had a metaphorical meaning, pe It seems, then, that one of the assump is unsupported. Literal interpretation alternative, metaphorical meanings. M be as automatically grasped as the lite tion of metaphorical interpretation m constraints as is literal-language under Yet both standard approaches can def an interpretation of these empirical f they must invoke the second assumpt or semantic deviance is a necessary an construction of a metaphorical interpr example, as Marcelo Dascal (1987 Dascal ( , 1989 tation of (6) was computed first and th some rule. A semantic theory, such as discrepancy between the selection rest "snake" results in deviance. A Gricean violation of the truth maxim. Regardless of the theory one chooses, one would have to agree that some rule violation or deviance could have been detected and that this violation could have been sufficient to trigger the construction of a metaphorical interpretation. If all this happens fast enough, the metaphorical meaning could interfere with people's responses to the literal meaning. So, one could explain the empirical results by assuming that the literal interpretation is indeed computed first, only to result in an anomaly, which, in turn, triggers a metaphorical interpretation. Such an alternative explanation is reasonable and is perfectly consistent with both the semantic and the pragmatic approach. However, we believe that it is false for the following reasons: The main thrust of the alternative explanation rests on the second assumption, that is, the assumption of anomaly, which holds only because the sentences used in the experiment were literally false. But one can easily imagine an analogous pattern of results with sentences that are not semantically deviant. For example, one could ask people to assess the literal truth of such a sentence as a mountain road is not a snake. (8) In contrast to (6) a mountain road is a According to either of the standard vi not trigger the construction of a m would predict the reverse: the metaph ignored and will interfere with the a meaning. Yet this hypothetical experim that could be used as counterargum pragmatic approaches. One obvious arg approach is that since semantic devian constructing a metaphorical meaning, filled, as in the case of (8), pragmatic p down the line may (or may not) even meaning. This would imply that we w sults, that is, the potential metaphoric with grasping the literal. A Gricean r periment, but for a different reason. result, a Gricean principle can still ac Grice's truth maxim, (8) violates the m mative. Because a mountain road is not a automatically trigger the constructio phorical interpretation. Again, it seem must be triggered by a rule violation such a conclusion may be premature. fute the objections of both standard s approaches.
Is Anomaly Necessary?
Up to this point, we have tried to argue against the assumption that literal meanings are computed prior to any other, non-literal meanings. We suggested that metaphorical meaning might be computed just as immediately and obligatorily as literal meaning. But we ran into a problem posed by the second assumption, the assumption that whenever deviance is detected in the literal interpretation, it triggers a metaphorical interpretation. The only way we can show that metaphors are just as hard to ignore is to show that they are computed even when no conceivable "trigger" exists. To demonstrate this, Boaz Keysar (1989a) presented people with sentences that could have both literal and metaphorical meanings. For instance, Rena lives in a castle (9) may be taken literally, if cally, if her home is an or tected, and so on. Such sen provided information abou sentence. For example, on star who bought a chateau another described her as h in the middle of the Arizo false. In addition to these mation about how privat Rena was said to have com ered by groupies, which r Alternatively, the inform was metaphorically false b housing development's bei texts, then, a sentence lik meaning. In two of the cas each other, when both were the two meanings contra other false. Again, people of such sentences as (9), gi
The question of interest able to focus completely o makes sense, or are they u cal meaning even where n clearly showed that even w computed the metaphorica a literally true sentence w second experiment (Keysar that these findings could a tices (as opposed to the ve that the construction of metaphorical interpretations need not require any triggering conditions at all.
We are now in a position to reject the two basic assumptions shared by the standard semantic and pragmatic approaches. First, literal interpretations do not take priority over metaphorical interpretations. Metaphorical meaning may be grasped as immediately and automatically as literal meanings. Secondly, we showed that neither a semantic anomaly nor the violation of a conversational rule is necessary for a metaphorical interpretation to be made. Recall that these two assumptions were the basis on which both standard approaches distinguished between literal and metaphorical interpretations: the metaphorical meaning, but not the literal, was considered the result of recognizing a communicative intent, that is, speakers must mean something else if anomaly is detected. However, what we have shown here suggests that the identification of both literal and metaphorical meanings may take place regardless of any communicative considerations.
When Are Communicative Principles Followed?
When a certain meaning makes sense in context, it is grasped whether it has a communicative function or not. Yet although a communicative function may not determine the detection of a sentence's potential meaning, it can guide the determination of which meaning is the intended one. In this sense, Grice's maxims may function as decision rules, if not as triggers for the construction of an interpretation. For example, a sentence may be taken metaphorically because of a judgment that the literal meaning could not have been intended. In the 1988 televised debate between the two U.S. vice-presidential candidates, Dan Quayle tried to assuage potential concerns about his age by reminding the audience that President Kennedy had also been young when he was elected. When his opponent, Senator Bentsen, responded, "You are no Jack Kennedy," his statement was taken figuratively because it was unreasonable to assume that he had meant it literally. In this sense, the determination that the metaphorical meaning is the more appropriate interpretation is guided by communicative principles. Is this a unique feature of non-literal speech? We suggest that literal interpretations are constrained by exactly the same kinds of communicative considerations. We argue that in analogous situations a statement may be taken literally because it couldn't have been meant metaphorically. In this sense, the decision rule operates similarly for literal and for metaphorical language.
To demonstrate this process, Keysar (1989b) asked people to complete and interpret such sentences as if this place were not a prison, then , (10) which presupposes that "this place" is a prison. These sentences appeared in different contexts, some of which were ambiguous and afforded both literal and metaphorical interpretations. Others included information to suggest that either a literal or a metaphorical reading of the presupposition would be inappropriate. For example, one context described the speaker as talking about a workplace, thus rendering the assumption literally false. Alternatively, another context provided information about how free and liberal the atmosphere was in "that place," thus suggesting that the presupposition was metaphorically false. The results were symmetrical for literal and metaphorical interpretations. In keeping with Grice's model, when the context rendered a literal interpretation of the presupposition of a sentence such as (10) false, people were much more likely to take the sentence metaphorically. More interestingly, when the context rendered it metaphorically false, people were more likely to take the sentence literally. The time needed to understand these sentences in their different contexts added convergent support for our hypothesis. People needed more time to understand a sentence metaphorically when doing so was the result of rejecting the alternative literal interpretation than when the metaphorical meaning was simply suggested by the context. Similarly, comprehension took longer for sentences that were interpreted literally because they could not have been meant metaphorically than for sentences whose interpretation did not involve such a decision. We conclude from these results that literal and metaphorical interpretations follow exactly the same kinds of decision rules when intended meanings are detected.
This conclusion implies a more general one: When communicative principles are taken into account in comprehension, they operate similarly for literal and metaphorical interpretations. When people understand language, they are constantly faced with the need to disambiguate utterances in order to arrive at intended meanings. Because literal language does not take priority in comprehension, this interpretation problem must be the same regardless of the final product of the interpretation, that is, regardless of whether the utterance was meant to be taken literally or figuratively. To solve this interpretation problem, people must use the same kind of strategy with both literal and metaphorical language.
How Is a Metaphorical Interpretation Constructed?
Until now our discussion has focused on metaphor identification. We have considered the conditions for metaphorical and literal interpretations, and the reasons for deciding which one is intended, but we have not yet directly addressed the problem of metaphor comprehension: How are metaphors understood? In what way is their inter-pretation constructed? The theories discussed so far do not provid adequate answers to these questions. Some semantic approaches, su as Levin's, do outline the way that a metaphor may be interpreted an extension of a literal interpretation via construing rules. Unfo tunately, such approaches depend on the unfounded assumptions o the literal interpretation's primacy and the necessity of deviance metaphor comprehension. Gricean theories do not address this que tion at all, but instead make the vague assumption that the listener reader "searches" for an alternative metaphorical meaning once ru violation has been detected. Searle (1979) does provide an account o how metaphors may be constructed. He outlines a number of path that may be taken from the literal to the metaphorical meaning in process of comprehending a sentence. But, as with Levin's model, empirical evidence refutes the basic assumptions underlying such model of stages. Neither model, then, can serve as a basis for a psyc logical theory of metaphor comprehension. In the remainder of t paper we will point out the shortcomings of traditional solutions to thi problem and then will outline an alternative model that accounts the way metaphors are understood. We will show how communicati principles, such as relevance and informativeness, underlie the co prehension process, arguing that any adequate theory of metapho understanding must accommodate those principles.
Metaphor as Comparison or Interaction
Consider the statement inflation is a time bomb. (11) What does it mean to comp of understanding entails unco the two terms, to answer the flation" and "time bomb" is e is easily resolved in the cours a grenade is a time bomb. (12) Here, "grenade" is understood as a me bombs" because the statement's form cally places "A" in the category "B." Th preting (11), however, because the categ typically include "inflation" as a memb was offered by the classical theory of m view (Roberts 1952) . According to this do not express a category relationship b bomb" but, instead, a comparison. Alth criticized by Max Black in 1962 , it still (1979 , for example, defended the comparison view and developed an interesting version of it. He argued that a "metaphor is an abbreviated simile" and that, because a simile is a comparison statement, "making the comparison explicit is the first riddle that a reader must solve" on encountering a metaphor. He suggests, for example, that understanding the metaphor his wife is his mother (13) "requires the reinsertion of structed provides the basis fo phor" (ibid.: 202). The basic id understand metaphors they tr two terms, the topic and the that underlies metaphors, so understood as a metaphorical inflation is like a time bomb. (14) Such similes were further analyzed he extended Amos Tversky's (1977) m characterized the similarity relation with such literal similarity statemen a mine is like a time bomb. (15) According to this theory, comparin fying the sets of their common an and inflation, for example, share w "may cause harm," "may have an ef future," and so on. Ortony argued fer from metaphorical comparisons salience of the shared features. He s statements the shared features are h metaphorical comparisons always in phorical comparisons, the shared f vehicle, but have low salience for t "may have an effect at an unpredic salient for "time bomb" but not fo the salience of features, Ortony w According to the salience-imbalance theory, these statements involve common features that are highly salient for the first term, "time bomb," but low in salience for the second term. Because they are uninformatively construed, these similes become anomalous once they are reversed.
While we agree with Ortony's appeal to communicative principles, such as informativeness, we argue that this is precisely where the salience-imbalance model falls short (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990) . We need to distinguish property salience in the mind of the speaker from property salience in the mind of a potential hearer. A speaker who tells someone that a nectarine is like a peach (18) may have properties in mind of hi vehicle: both nectarines and peaches have pits, and so on. For a hearer similarities, the statement is uninfor taken non-literally because uttering s versational maxim to be informative. For hearers who do not know what nectarines are like, however, the statement would be informative. At the same time, the statement involves properties of high salience for the vehicle, peaches, but of either low or no salience in the mind of the hearer for the topic, nectarine. Indeed, for hearers, all informative statements have this character: the ground must, by definition, be highly salient in the sentence vehicle and of either low salience or none at all in the sentence topic. Therefore, sentence (18) illustrates that comparisons with low/high matches are not uniquely metaphorical.
Informative literal statements have the same structure.
This analysis reveals a more central problem with comparison models in general. If a metaphor is conceived of as a comparison, then hearers must know enough about the topic to discover the grounds for comparison. In Ortony's terms, the set of (relevant) common features must not be empty. But people could easily understand such similes as Ceausescu is a small-scale Hitler (19) even before knowing about the atroci regime in Romania. Such sentences d understand a metaphor even when th initially include anything that is relev phor.
Examples such as (19) motivated Black (1962) to reject the comparison view and to suggest an alternative. He argued that what is uncovered when a metaphor is understood is not a comparison or a similarity relation, but a more complex interaction between the two terms. The notion of "interaction" is sufficiently vague to allow for a variety of interpretations, but the underlying idea is that the topic of a metaphor is perceived "in terms of" the vehicle. Even though we are sympathetic to the general idea of the interaction view, it is notoriously difficult to evaluate because no theory suggests a detailed analysis of such an interaction. For example, this view is unclear about what relationship between the topic and the vehicle must be constructed in order to understand the metaphor. In the next section, we will outline a new theory of metaphor (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990 ) that avoids the problems of the comparison view and provides a straightforward mechanism for uncovering metaphorical relations. After we describe the theory, we will demonstrate how it explains seemingly unrelated metaphoric phenomena.
Metaphor as Categorization
Earlier we noted that the comparison view assumes the relationship expressed in a metaphor to be that of similitude rather than categorization because the form of such metaphors as (2) afisherman is a spider seems to suggest a categorical falsity. But this assumption holds true only if "spider" can refer solely to "any numerous arachnids of the order Araneae, having eight legs, a body divided into cephalothorax and an abdomen, and several spinnerets that produce silk used to make nests, cocoons, or webs for trapping insects" (American Heritage Dictionary, 2d coll. ed., s.v. "spider"). But if the vehicle stands for a higher-level category that can include "fisherman," then categorization may be what underlies such metaphors. We suggest that this is precisely the way metaphors are understood (Glucksberg and Keysar 1990) . How is this achieved? Consider the following metaphor:
his sermon was a sleeping pill. (20) We suggest that this metaphor is understoo in a category of sleep-inducing things, whi and which may also include such things as warm milk, and so on. In this sense, the m exactly what it seems, a class-inclusion stat this claim, we need to explain how this cat how it can be named "sleeping pills." The construction of the category may be ing the general nature of classification. La shown that multiple classification is a centra ceptual system because everything can b categories. "Sleeping pills" may belong to m things: they are a kind of pill, but they are to the category of things that may be bought in pharmacies; they are i the class of sleep-inducing things, and so on. Similarly, "sermon" be classified in many different categories, some of which also inclu sleeping pills as a member. We argue that in order to understand su metaphors as (20), precisely these categories must be uncovered, t is, the categories to which both topic and vehicle belong.
Yet the topic and the vehicle may each belong to numerous ad h categories, some of which may be totally irrelevant to the meaning the metaphor. For example, both "sermons" and "sleeping pills" ca belong to such categories as "should not be used excessively," whic would not reveal the meaning of the metaphor. The question is, w determines which of these categories is relevant? One possible answ may be found in another aspect of ad hoc categories that Barsa discovered. He has shown that, as with common categories, such a hoc categories have a graded structure, meaning that some memb are more typical than others. We suggest that the relevant catego is the one that the vehicle typifies. Sleeping pills do not typify s categories as "products that may be bought in a pharmacy," but of the categories to which sleeping pills belong, they uniquely typify category of sleep-inducing things.
If metaphors of the form "an A is a B" are understood as genui category statements, then "A" should be a subordinate of the sup ordinate "B." The second term should be the name of the superord nate category. But ad hoc categories do not have conventional nam They are normally descriptions, such as "things to pack when tra ing." In contrast to such ad hoc categories, we argue that the categ that is relevant to the metaphor does have a name: it takes the vehi name. We suggest that because the vehicle typifies the ad hoc catego it can be used as its name. Thus "sleeping pills" not only typify t category of sleep-inducing things, but may also be used to name t superordinate category. If the vehicle does indeed stand for the c gory, then the metaphor must be understood as expressing a genui category relation.
The notion that a typical member, such as "sleeping pills," may ac ally name a category to which it belongs might initially seem stran Yet, it is actually a device that is common to many languages. Ame can Sign Language (ASL) does not have lexicalized terms for m superordinate categories. In order to refer to a superordinate cate gory, signers use the terms for typical members of that category. example, the sign for "jewelry" is "RING, NECKLACE, BRACELET, ET (Newport and Bellugi 1978) . Only recently have some categories, s as "furniture" and "fruit," been lexicalized in ASL, probably becau of the influence of spoken language.
Not only is the name of a typical member borrowed to name th superordinate, but these two uses are kept clearly distinct. This sharp distinction was illustrated in a 1987 newspaper interview that was conducted in Israel. During that time, John Demjanjuk was on trial, accused of being "Ivan the Terrible," one of the sadistic guards at the concentration camp of Treblinka. Even though the main issue of the trial was whether or not he was Ivan the Terrible, Demjanjuk's name came to typify the category of people who committed such crimes against humanity. An interview with an Israeli citizen showed how the name "Demjanjuk" was distinctively used, on the one hand, for the person whose innocence/identity was in question and, on the other hand, to name the whole category of such people as Ivan the Terrible:
Israeli: If he is a Demjanjuk, then he should be condemned to death.
Reporter: But he is Demjanjuk, his name is John Demjanjuk.
Israeli: I know his name is Demjanjuk, but I don't know if he is A Demjanjuk. (Shinoff 1987: 48) The same linguistic device that is used in such languages as ASL may be responsible for the way we understand metaphors. (For examples of the use of this device in other languages, see Glucksberg and Keysar 1990: 8-9 .)Just as a typical member of a category can name the superordinate in those languages, so can the vehicle of a metaphor name the category it typifies. Therefore, to understand such metaphors as (20) his sermon was a sleeping pill, we must construct an ad hoc category to which both belong and which sleeping pills typify. The relation that the metaphor expresses, then, is that of categorization: "his sermon" is classified as a member of this newly created category named by the vehicle.
This account is able to explain seemingly unrelated metaphoric phenomena by means of the same underlying mechanism. First, we will consider the nonreversibility of metaphors. If metaphors were understood as comparisons, it would be possible to reverse a metaphor and still have a meaningful sentence. But if the mind is a sponge (21) is reversed, the result is an anom a sponge is the mind. (22) The reason is that (21) is not un categorization statement, and, as such as a shark is a fish, (23) when reversed they yield still meaningful even after sentence never retains the meaning of the original metaphor; it has a different ground. For example, while the statement an encyclopedia is a jungle (24) suggests that it is very hard to find one' this jungle is an encyclopedia (25) might mean that it is quite possible to lea this particular jungle. Those apparently re support our general claim: (24) is reversib clopedia," happens to typify a certain cate (24) and (25) are different precisely becau dia" typify radically different categories.
Interestingly, the same holds for metaph like comparisons, namely, similes. Thes comparisons but, instead, like metaphors are reversed, the perceived similarity is n 1977). For example, the statement a quince is like an apple (26) expresses a stronger degree of sim an apple is like a quince. (27) As Tversky observed, a variant of a to a typical member than the othe larity statements are asymmetrical. If were that of comparison or similarit also result in a reduction of perceiv not manifest asymmetry but, instea phors, when similes are reversed th For example, the simile the mind is like a sponge (28) is meaningless when reversed: a sponge is like the mind. (29) The reason, we suggest, is that even comparison, the relation uncovered is categorization.
This leads us to an additional metaphoric phenomenon that we can now explicate. If similarity is the underlying relation in similes, it is hard to explain why only similes and not literal comparisons can be expressed as class-inclusion statements. How can the comparison of two such dissimilar entities as "sponge" and "mind" be expressed not only as the comparison (28), but also as the class-inclusion statement (21) the mind is a sponge? In contrast to similes, literal comparisons between "like" things cannot be expressed in a class-inclusion form. For example, a literal comparison, such as (26) a quince is like an apple, cannot be paraphrased *a quince is an apple. The reason that similes can be expressed as metaphors is that they express an implicit relation of categorization. "The mind is like a sponge," then, can be expressed as a class-inclusion statement because "the mind is a sponge." In contrast to Miller's (1979) suggestion that metaphors are abbreviated similes, we argue that similes are taken as implicit metaphors, that is, as implicit classifications. This view of metaphor-as-class-inclusion allows us to reconsider the issue of metaphor and communication, but before doing so, we will assess an alternative approach in which verbal metaphors are assumed to almost always rely on preexisting conceptual metaphors.
Attributive Class Inclusion or Conceptual Mapping?
Our class-inclusion view suggests that metaphors involve the construction of novel categories that are typified by metaphor vehicles and that attribute the categories' properties to metaphor topics. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980a, 1980b) argue that metaphorical language virtually always relies on preexisting conceptual mappings. They suggest that the human conceptual system is "fundamentally metaphorical in character " (1980b: 195) . Abstract concepts, such as the concept of IDEA, are understood in terms of such conceptual mappings as IDEAS ARE ORGANISMS. This type of conceptual root metaphor is said to account for the systematicity that seems to underlie the way in which people talk about ideas. The metaphors his ideas finally bore fruit, (30) their idea died on the vine, (31) she has a fertile imagination (32) are all motivated by the metaphorical m which is itself an instantiation of the mo ORGANISMS.
Raymond Gibbs (in press) argues further that conce form the basis for the vast majority of metaphors an parently novel metaphors do not create attributive ca but instead rely upon preexisting conceptual mapping metaphors, for example, presumably rely on the root IS A JOURNEY:
Our love is a voyage to the bottom of the sea. (33) We may have to go our separate ways. (34) Our love is a bumpy roller coaster ride. (35) When people use such metaphorical expressions, no n categories are created. Instead, all are predicated o metaphor of love as a journey: "There is a tight map to which entities in the domain of love (e.g., the lovers, their common goals, the love relationship, etc.) correspond systematically to entities in the domain of a journey" (ibid.). A closer analysis, however, reveals that this apparent systematicity is illusory. Consider the "journey" metaphor in the assertion that our trip to Europe was a bumpy roller coaster ride. (36) If such metaphors derive their meaning from the preexisting conceptual mapping x IS A JOURNEY, then the meaning of (36) is simply that our trip to Europe was a journey! Surely, people would not use or interpret (36) in such an inane manner. Instead, the metaphor' vehicle, "bumpy roller coaster ride," is used to attribute such properties as "rough" and "uncomfortable" to the metaphor's topic, "our trip to Europe." Similarly, the roller coaster vehicle in (35) attributes to "our love" not the properties of a journey, but instead the properties of roughness, widely swinging moods and emotions, jolting ups and downs, and so on.
One might argue that a metaphor's topic interacts with its vehicle to produce a particular instantiation of a preexisting conceptual metaphor, but this is neither necessary nor desirable. The concept of "journey," for example, does not seem to be a factor in the interpretation of "bumpy roller coaster ride." Metaphors (35) and (36), above, seem to be similar to one another because of the specific properties that are typified by roller coaster rides, but not by journeys at all. In addition, (35) is more similar to (36) than it is to (33) or (34), above, even though all the love metaphors use one or another form of the LOVE IS AJOURNEY concept.
The preexisting-conceptual-mapping approach encounters severe difficulties in accounting for such relationships among metaphors precisely because it ignores the specific properties that metaphor vehicles attribute to their topics. We do not claim, of course, that such conceptual mappings as LOVE IS AJOURNEY do not exist, only that such general concepts may be irrelevant to specific metaphorical uses. In the extreme case, the conceptual-mapping approach may be downright misleading. We have already argued that the metaphor vehicle "bumpy roller coaster ride" may not depend on the "'journey" concept at all. The generalization that follows from this example is that one cannot identify the ground for a metaphor from the common taxonomic category of the metaphor vehicle. Consider the following apparent instantiations of the LOVE IS A CONTAINER conceptual metaphor:
We're trapped in a rotten marriage. (37) Our relationship has become a prison. (38) Our relationship is nothing but a filing cabinet. (39) True, there are container-like properties in each of these metaphors: involuntary and unpleasant containment is obvious in (37) and (38), but what is one to make of (39)? When we asked some people to interpret (39), the overwhelming majority failed to mention any containerlike properties at all, focusing instead on the organized, businesslike, unemotional properties associated with the metaphor vehicle, "filing cabinet."
The preexisting-conceptual-metaphor view, then, seems not only to be unable to account for how people interpret ordinary nominative metaphors, but it may also be seriously misleading. It cannot say how people interpret metaphors because it is silent on the specific properties attributed to metaphor topics by specific metaphor vehicles. It may be misleading because it takes as the conceptual basis for a metaphor the common taxonomic category of the vehicle. As we have seen, this category may be totally irrelevant to the ground of a metaphor. What, then, are we to make of the availability of any number of metaphors of the form LOVE IS A [type of] JOURNEY? On the basis of our attributive class-inclusion view, we would simply argue that various kinds of love can be identified with various types of journeys: pleasant, idyllic, stormy, placid, exciting, heavenly, fruitless, tormenting . . . the list is endless. To the extent that a type of journey, or a type of anything else, for that matter, exemplifies any one of these properties, could that type of journey be used as a metaphor for a certain type of love? Not if the concept of journey per se were totally irrelevant to the metaphor itself. Instead, certain aspects of love could be characterized as certain aspects of journeys or plants or animals, or anything else, to the extent that the "anything else" typified a property or properties that could be attributed to an aspect of love. At best, the preexisting-conceptualmapping view provides a generalization: classes of metaphor topics, such as LOVE, may be characterized as one or another type of metaphor vehicle, such as JOURNEY. The more specific metaphoric work has to be done by more specific mechanisms, such as attributive class inclusion via the creation of novel metaphor/vehicle categories.
Communicative Functions of Metaphor
In our first sections, we considered the identification of metaphorical meaning and argued that some aspects of metaphor identification are governed by communicative principles, while some are independent of such principles. In contrast to standard theories, we suggested that literal language is subject to exactly the same constraints. We concluded that the processes underlying identification do not distinguish between literal and metaphorical language. We then went on to outline a new model of metaphor understanding that does not rely on the assumptions of the standard theories. In this final section, we will con-sider some functions of metaphor and propose that the class-inclusion approach has direct implications for a unique communicative function of metaphor.
Metaphors are considered tools for conveying new information by old means. But this function is not unique to metaphors. First, one can obviously convey new information by literal means. Secondly, people generally treat utterances as informative, and, as Grice has argued, even when certain utterances seem to be uninformative, they are eventually taken as informative. In addition, even when metaphors are no longer new, people still consider them to be metaphors. For example, statements as common as my surgeon was a butcher are still judged metaphorical. If the unique function of metaphor is not to convey new information, then what is its function? When do people choose to employ a metaphor rather than a simile or a literal form of expression?
We suggest that the unique function of metaphors does not lie in the novelty of the information conveyed, but in the way that it is conveyed. The information is conveyed via categorization, which suggests a strongly connected pattern of relations. This allows metaphors to function as descriptive devices that can capture the whole structure of a theme via a single phrase. For example, in a study of thematic similarity, a story about a businessman relying on advice from his bankrupt friend was entitled "The Blind Leading the Blind" (Seifert, Abelson, McKoon, and Ratcliff 1986) . Such titles capture the essence of themes accurately and succinctly. Cristina Cacciari and Sam Glucksberg (1991) identified such phrases as quasi-metaphorical idioms and argued that they achieve their goal because they function in a manner that is analogous to a metaphor vehicle. Metaphorical idioms refer to particular events or actions and, at the same time, stand for the whole category of thematically related circumstances that they typify. In this example, the concrete actions of a blind person directing another and the failed businessman advising his unskilled friend are both members of a set of actions sharing this common theme that is best articulated by the metaphorical idiom the blind leading the blind. So by using a quasi-metaphorical idiom, one is able to distill a whole set of relevant aspects of a theme, an event, or an action. This is possible because the metaphor identifies the target event as an instance of a more general category of such events. In a communicative setting, the choice of a metaphorical form indicates the strength of the suggested attribution. The more wholistic the intended attribution, the more appropriate is the metaphorical form. Consider the following example: In the film The Great Dictator, Charles Chaplin plays two characters, a dictator called Hynkel, who looks just like Hitler, and a Jewish barber who resembles Hitler (or Hynkel). The literal comparison statement
Conclusions
Metaphorical and literal language are processed similarly. We have argued that communicative principles may not be required for the construction of a metaphorical interpretation any more than they are required for a literal interpretation. In this sense, the construction of metaphorical interpretations is no more a function of communication than is the construction of literal interpretations. Moreover, when communicative principles are applied in choosing an appropriate interpretation, they must operate similarly in the selection of either a metaphorical or a literal interpretation. In this sense, literal language is no less a function of communication than metaphors are. Communicative principles, then, cannot distinguish between the processes that lead one to take an utterance literally or metaphorically.
Although the processes that underlie comprehension do not distinguish between literal and metaphorical language, there is a difference in use, as we point out. We argue that a metaphor expresses a classification and is understood as such. As a classification, it suggests a strongly patterned inheritance of properties from the newly constructed attributive category to the topic. This distinguishes metaphors from both similes and literal comparisons. The use of a metaphor serves the communicative function of indicating the strength of the implied attribution. We suggest that, in general, the uniqueness of metaphors may be found in the realm of use, rather than in comprehension processes.
